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Abstract 
M. Cialdea, Resolution for some first-order modal systems, Theoretical Computer Science 8.5 (1991) 
213-229. 
In this paper we present a resolution method for first-order modal logic, which derives from an 
extension of already known propositional methods. The main feature of our approach to the 
problem of quantification in modal logic is a purely syntactical solution, embedded in a proposi- 
tional method, which is a very close relative of classical resolution. Such results represent a contribu- 
tion to the extension of logic programming to intensional languages. 
1. Introduction 
In the last years nonclassical logics have shown to be a suitable tool for the 
formalization of several problems in important fields of computer science and artifi- 
cial intelligence. In particular, modal logics present a broad spectrum of applications, 
allowing to express nonextensional concepts such as necessity, obligation (deontic 
logics), temporal reference (temporal logics), knowledge (epistemic logics). These logics 
have been used for the treatment of problems in fields such as problem solving [22], 
knowledge representation [lS], natural language processing [22], information retrieval 
[29], analysis and synthesis of programs [24-271 and programming languages [16]. 
In spite of their expressive power, however, intensional logics are sometimes 
avoided, because of the lack of efficient proof procedures for them, and preference is 
given to classical logic. Therefore, an important question to be answered is how to 
extend, to intensional logics, the most efficient automated deduction results known for 
*This paper contains a part of the results obtained in [8], with some improvement and generalization of 
the proof methods. 
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classical logic and, in particular, the resolution method [7,30], on which the program- 
ming language Prolog is based. 
Automatizable proof procedures for quantified modal logics have been defined in 
[2, 3, 19, 21, 231. 
Our approach represents a first-order extension of a resolution method, defined for 
several propositional modal systems [12-151. Its main features are the possibility of 
an early detection and elimination of elementary inconsistencies, and its verified 
suitability as a basis for the implementation of a modal extension of Prolog, the 
programming language Molog [16], which is at present under development. Its first 
interpreter has been implemented in Prolog on a DPS-8 [4], and modalities for the 
realization of a compiled version are at present being studied [6]. 
The resolution method thereby used are, however, limited to act on prenex for- 
mulae, thus failing to capture, for example, an epistemic statement such as “The wise 
man knows that someone has a white hat”. 
Part of the results exposed in this work, namely, a Herbrand theorem analog, has 
appeared in print before [l 11. This paper offers the opportunity to set that work in the 
context of automatic proof procedures for modal systems, showing how it can be used 
to extend existing propositional resolution methods to full first-order logic. 
Section 2 contains the definition of the modal systems which are considered. Unlike 
[2], first-order resolution is defined here for systems which do not have the Barcan 
formula as an axiom. In this paper definitions and proofs are given in detail only for 
the case of one of the simplest modal systems, D, which is a subtheory of the better 
known modal systems T, S4 and S.5 [20]. The paper includes, however, also some 
hints on the possibility of extending the same results to the systems T and S4. 
Therefore, in Section 2 we define not only D, but also T and S4. All the proofs 
presented in this paper are purely syntactical, so the definition of the semantics of the 
modal systems considered is not included. It can be found in any introductory text on 
modal logic, such as [20]. 
Section 3 contains some definitions, leading finally to the notion of modal skolemiz- 
ation. Successively, modal unification (Section 4) and modal resolution (Section 5) are 
defined. Section 6 contains an outline of the completeness and soundness proof for the 
resolution system. Finally (Sections 7 and 8), we give a brief presentation of different 
approaches to the extension of classical resolution to modal logic and compare such 
works with ours. 
2. The modal systems under consideration 
The logical language of modal systems consists of all the classical logical symbols 
and the modal operator 0 (necessity). Modal formulae include all classical formulae 
and the formulae of the form CIA, where A is a modal formula. The modal operator 
0 (possibility) is defined as follows: 
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The three modal systems D, T and S4 are defined as follows. Their derivation rules are 
the classical rules and the necessitation rule: 
A 
-. 
q A 
The axioms of D are all the axioms of classical logic and 
(Dl) q (A+B)+(OA-+ Ok?), 
(D2) U/l-+ 0 A. 
The axioms of T are (Dl) and 
(T) CIA-A. 
The axioms of S4 are (Dl), ( T) and 
(3) CIA+0 DA. 
We note again that Barcan formula 
Vx q A(x)+ q VxA(x) 
is not an axiom (nor a theorem) of any of the three theories. Thus, from a semantical 
point of view, the domains associated with possible worlds are not necessarily 
identical. However, if a world w is accessible from w’, then the domain associated with 
w includes the domain associated with w’. The behaviour of the quantifiers w.r.t. 
modal operators can be described by observing that the following formulae are all 
theorems of the theories: 
q VxA(x)+Vx 0 A(x), 
OVxA(x)+Vx 0 A(x), 
3x 0 A(x)+ q 3xA(x), 
3x 0 A(x)+ 0 3xA(x), 
while their converses are not theorems: 
Vx 0 A(x)+ q VxA(x), 
vx OA(x)+ OVxA(x), 
q 3xA(x)dx q A(x), 
03xA(x)+3x OA(x). 
These syntactical laws, i.e. the provability or nonprovability of the above for- 
mulae, can be seen as stating the following informal property: universal quantifiers 
can be moved outwards across modal operators, but not inwards; dually, existential 
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quantifiers can be moved inwards across modal operators, but not outwards. The 
basic principle underlying our definition of modal unification will practically stem out 
of this simple feature. 
3. Modal skolemization 
The application of classical skolemization to modal formulae is not sound in 
general. For example, the set 
POP(X), q 3YlP(Y)) 
can easily be seen to be consistent, while 
where c is an individual constant, is an inconsistent set of formulae. 
In this section we define a modal extension of the skolemization rule, which, by 
keeping track of the modal context in which a quantifier occurs, allows a sound 
definition of substitution for modally skolemized formulae. 
From now onwards we consider 0 as a primitive symbol. 
3.1. If A is a subformula of a modal formula C, then the modal degree of A is equal 
to the number of modal operators which have A in their scope. Furthermore, if A has 
the form QxB(x), where Q is a quantifier, then the modal degree of the variable x in 
C and the modal degree of the quantifier Q in C are both equal to the modal degree of 
A in C. The notion of modal degree is extended to apply to free variables by 
stipulating that if the variable x is free in C, then its modal degree is 0. 
3.2. A modal formula A is a positiveformula iff A contains no implications, and no 
logical symbol in A lies in the scope of a negation. 
Clearly, every formula A can be transformed into an equivalent formula A’ which is 
a positive formula by applying the classical equivalences and 
Before introducing the modal notion of Skolem normal form, we define a relativized 
version of the classical notion of prenex formula. As there is no risk of confusion, the 
same names, “prenex normal form” and “Skolem normal form”, are used to denote the 
modal notions defined in the following paragraphs. 
3.3. A modal formula A is in prenex normal form iff 
(i) A is a positive formula, and 
(ii) A is locally prenex, i.e. A can no longer be submitted to the transformations used 
in classical logic to obtain prenex formulae. For example, the following formula is not 
locally prenex: 
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because it can still be transformed into 
VX3Y(P(X)V q VMX>Y)A OdY,Z))). 
This latter formula is locally prenex. 
Every formula A can be transformed into an equivalent formula A’ which is in 
prenex normal form. 
In what follows, we consider only modal formulae in prenex normal form, so that 
from now onwards “modal formula” stands, in fact, for “modal formula in prenex 
normal form”. This assumption is not essential for the results obtained here, but it 
simplifies both the exposition and the proofs. 
Moreover, we suppose that if S is a set of formulae, then there are no two bound 
variables in S with the same name. Finally, we generally speak only of closed formulae. 
Exceptions are explicitly stated. 
The notion of Skolem normal form, which we are now going to define, is somewhat 
atypical. In fact, if A is a modal formula, its Skolem normal form is an expression 
which is not a modal formula itself: it is a modal expression, without quantifiers, which 
can contain symbols labeled by a natural number, which will be written as an 
exponent. 
The procedure for the elimination of existential and universal quantifiers is similar 
to the corresponding classical one, but here the modal degree of the quantifier being 
eliminated is saved in the natural number which labels the functional term or the free 
variable corresponding to it. 
3.4. If C is a modal formula in prenex normal form and n is a natural number, then 
we define the auxiliary transformation Skn by induction on the subformulae of C as 
follows: 
Skn( P, n) = P, if P is a literal, 
Skn(A A B, n)= Skn(A, n) A Skn(B, n), 
Skn(A V B, n)= Skn(A, n) V Skn(B, n), 
Skn(ClA,n)= q Skn(A,n+ l), 
Skn(OA,n)=OSkn(A,n+l), 
Skn(VxA(x), n)= Skn(A(x”), n), 
where fX is a new functional symbol, and y, , . . . , y, are all the variables free in 3x4(x). 
We are finally ready to define the modal skolemization analog. 
3.5. If C is a modal formula in prenex normal form, then C is transformed into 
Skolem normal form by the application of the transformation Sk defined by 
Sk(C) = Skn(C, 0). 
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If S={A 1, . . . , A,} is a set of modal formulae in prenex normal form, then Sk(S) is 
the set {Sk@,), . . . . Sk@&,)}. 
3.6. If a symbol s in Sk(C) is labeled by the natural number n, ten n is called the level 
of s in Sk(C). 
It can easily be verified that for any quantified variable x occurring in C the natural 
number labeling (the outermost symbol of) the corresponding term in Sk(C) is equal 
to the modal degree of x in C. Here are some examples: 
Sk(v’xQ q P(X,Y))= •P(x~,.I-~(~~)), 
SW’x q ~YP(x,Y))= •~(x~,.f’(x~)L 
WnVx3yp(x,y))= fl~(x’,f’(x’)). 
In the sequel, the symbols without levels are considered to be in the level 0, i.e. the 
set of all symbols in level 0 contains also the symbols without levels. 
Skolem normal formulae are examples of expressions called labeled formulae, 
which are defined as follows. 
3.7. A modal expression E is a labeled formula iff it is obtained from a modal 
formula without quantifiers (which can, however, contain free variables) by assigning 
a level to some constant, variable or functional symbol in such a way that 
(i) ifs is a constant, a variable or a functional symbol, then either every occurrence 
of s in E is labeled by the same level, or s has no levels; 
(ii) if a symbol s is in the level n, then every occurrence of s is in the scope of at least 
n modal operators; 
(iii) if f is a functional symbol in level n, which occurs in E in the form f(tl, . . . , t,), 
then the level of each symbol occurring in ti, for all 1 did m, is less than or equal to n. 
For any modal formula C, Sk(C) clearly satisfies (i)-(iii). 
Labeled formulae are denoted by capital letters (A, B, C, . . .), just like modal for- 
mulae. To avoid confusion, we shall always state explicitly whether A (B, C, . ..) is 
a labeled formula or a modal formula. 
4. Modal substitutions and unification 
In this section we are going to define a notion of substitution for labeled formulae, 
which is similar to the corresponding classical notion, except there are some restric- 
tions imposed on the levels of symbols. What we obtain is in fact a notion which has 
some similarity with substitution in many-sorted logics: here sorts are denoted by 
natural numbers, called ‘levels’, and they are such that the set of objects of sort n is 
a subset of the set of objects of sort m for each m>n. Substitutions are denoted by 
greek lower case letters (0, c, p, .). 
4.1. A modal substitution is a finite set of the form {tI/xI, . . ..t.,/x,,}, where 
(1) every xi is a variable, every ti is a term different from xi, and for all i, j such that 
i#j, Xi is different from xj; 
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(2) every variable xi and every symbol occurring in ti may be labeled by a level; 
(3) for all i, if II is the level of xi, then for every symbol s”‘, which occurs in ti, m is less 
than or equal to II. 
In other words, if the level of x is n and if the term t contains some symbol whose 
level is greater than IZ, then the substitution of t for x is forbidden. 
If E is an expression, the result of the application of the substitution 0 to E is 
denoted by EB. 
The definitions of composition of modal substitutions (denoted by 0 0 a), modal unijier 
of a set of expressions, and most general modal unifier of a set of expressions are the 
same as in classical logic. Obviously, the modal notions obtained are different from 
the corresponding classical ones. However, as there is no risk of confusion, in the 
sequel we simply speak of substitutions, unifiers, m.g.u., etc. 
Some examples will give an intuitive explication of the third restriction in the 
definition of substitution. Let us consider the set of modal formulae 
S={OVxp(x),3y Olp(y)}, Sk(S)={Op(x’), Olp(c”)}. As the level of x is greater 
than the level of c, the substitution of c for x is allowed, thus leading to the inconsistent 
set { q p(cO), 0 lp(c’)}. The admissibility of the substitution reflects the theorems 
governing the movement of universal quantifiers across modal operators (Section 2). 
In fact, q Vxp(x) implies Vx Up(x), i.e. the universal quantifier in S can be brought to 
a position where it has the same modal degree as the existential quantifier. Further 
simple transformations show that Vx Up(x) is equivalent to 13x 0 1 p(x). 
Let now S be {Vx Up(x), 03~ lp(y)}. H ere none of the two quantifiers can be 
moved. This fact is respected by the definition of substitution, which does not allow 
the replacement of x by c in Sk(S)= { q p(xO), 0 lp(c’)}. 
It should be pointed out that, unlike [21], the notion of modal unification does not 
answer for sets of modal formulae which are consistent by virtue of the propositional 
form of their components. For example, let S be the set (OVxp(x), 3~0 lp( y)} and 
Sk(S)= { Op(x’), 0 lp(c’)}. In Sk(S), x would be replaceable with c, but, as we shall 
see in the next section, it is the propositional basis of the system that prevents the 
application of the resolution rule. 
5. The resolution rules 
The resolution system is here defined in detail only for the system D, even if some 
hints are given also for the systems T and S4. The same will be done in the 
completeness and soundness proofs. 
Resolution rules are defined over labeled formulae in such a way that a set S of 
closed first-order modal formulae (in prenex normal form) is contradictory if and only 
if Sk(S) is refutable by means of the resolution rules. So, in order to refute S, each 
formula in S is first transformed into Skolem normal form; then the resolution rules 
can be applied. 
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The modal first-order resolution system is defined by merging the notion of modal 
substitution and the propositional resolution rules for the system D defined in [15] or 
[12]. However, the structure of the definition given here is slightly different from [15] 
and [12], because the rules can here be applied to formulae which need not be in 
modal clausal form. 
In what follows, I denotes the empty formula (or the false). 
5.1. Let S be a set containing one or two labeled formulae and 8 a substitution. 
Then C is a besolvent of S if it can be obtained by applying the following recursive 
definition to the subformulae of S. The definition is given by three sets of rules as 
follows, where we use S’ to denote a set containing at most a single formula. 
5.1.1. Classical rules 
(cl) I is a 8-resolvent of {P,, 1 P2} if 8 is an m.g.u. of {PI, P2 >. 
(~2) If C is a Q-resolvent of S’u{A}, then CV B8 is a &resolvent of s’u {A VII}. 
(~3) If C is a 8-resolvent of S’u{A}, then CAB8 is a t9-resolvent of S’u {A AB}. 
(~4) If C is a 0-resolvent of {A, B}, then C is a 8-resolvent of {A A B}. 
5.1.2. Modal rules 
(ml) If C is a 8-resolvent of {A,B}, then UC is a &resolvent of { q A, q B}. 
(m2) If C is a 0-resolvent of {A), then q IC is a 0-resolvent of (OA}. 
(m3) If C is a Q-resolvent of {A, B}, then 0 C is a 8-resolvent of {CIA, OB}. 
(m4) If C is a Q-resolvent of (A}, then 0 C is a ,9-resolvent of { 0.4). 
5.1.3. Simplification rules 
(sl) If I A A is a 8-resolvent of S, then I is a 8-resolvent of S. 
(~2) If I VA is a 8-resolvent of S, then A is a B-resolvent of S. 
(~3) If 01 is a 0-resolvent of S, then I is a 8-resolvent of S. 
(~4) If 01 is a Q-resolvent of S, then I is a Gresolvent of S. 
For example, a resolvent of the set of labeled formulas { 0 (p(x’) A 4(x1)), q (~p(c’) 
Vr(c’))} can be constructed starting from the fact that I is a B-resolvent of 
{p(x’), lp(c’)} for 8= {co/x’} by rule cl. From this follows by rule c2 that I V r(c’) 
is a 0-resolvent of { p(x’), ip(cO) V r(c”)}, and by s2 that r(c’) is a e-resolvent 
of {p(x’), ~p(c’)Vr(c’)}. By c3, r(c’)Aq(c’) is a Gresolvent of 
(p(x’)Aq(x’),~p(c”)Vr(co)), and, finally, O(r(c’)Aq(c’)) is a 0-resolvent of 
{O(p(x’)Aq(x’)), q (~p(c”)Vr(co))). 
This example shows also that the t!?-resolvent of a set of formulae is not uniquely 
determined. In fact, if the above sequence of applications of rules c2, ~2, c3 is replaced 
by the sequence c3, sl, c2, ~2, then we obtain that Or(c’) is a 8-resolvent of 
{O(p(x’)Aq(x’)), q (~p(c”)Vr(co))l. 
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To simplify the proofs of the theorems, from now onwards 01 and 01 are 
considered identical to I, so that the rules s3 and s4 can be omitted from the 
definition above. 
The rules for system D are of the simplest kind, because D does not include laws that 
may change the modal degree of formulae such as 
(T) q A+A; 
(S4) q A+OclA. 
In both ( T) and (S4), the modal degree of A in the antecedent of the implication is 
different from the modal degree of A in the consequent. The definition of the 
resolution rule for the systems T and S4 must contain some additional clauses which 
reflect the possibility of deriving Sk(A) from Sk( q A), and Sk( 0 q A) from Sk( 0 A). 
Here the level of terms must be manipulated according to the modification of the 
modal degrees of the corresponding variables in the modal formulae. 
Thus, to obtain a resolution system for the systems T and S4, before starting the 
application of the recursive definition of 8-resolvent, the modal degree of subformulae 
in S should be remembered. The following items should then be added to the modal 
rules: 
(m.5) If C is a B-resolvent of S’ u {A’], then C is a 8-resolvent of S’ u { 0 A}, where A’ 
is obtained from A by subtracting one from the level of those symbols which 
have a level greater than the modal degree of q A in S. 
and, for the system S4 only 
(m6) If C is a 8-resolvent of S’ u { 0 q A’}, then C is a 8-resolvent of S’ u { q A}, 
where A’ is obtained from A by adding one to the level of those symbols which 
have a level greater than the modal degree of q A in S. 
5.2. The resolution system consists of the following rules (the first two rules are 
structural rules, while the third is the resolution rule). 
Factorization rule: 
C[D V F] 
(CCDI ) 0 
if 8 is an m.g.u. of D and F. 
Duplication rule: 
CCW”)l 
CCW’)AD(Y”)I 
if y is a new variable, x” occurs only in D(x”), D(x”) is not in the scope of more than 
n modal operators, and D(x”) is not in the scope of a negation. 
Resolution rule: 
S 
c 
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if S is a set containing one or two labeled formulae and C is a B-resolvent of S. 
5.3. A deduction of a labeled formula A from a set S of labeled formulae is a tree 
whose root is A, whose leaves are elements of S, and any of its nodes B, whose 
immediate descendent(s) is (are) C (and D) is the conclusion of one of the inference 
rules given above, whose premiss (premisses) is (are) C (and D). 
5.4. A deduction of the empty formula I from the set S of labeled formulae is 
a refutation of S. If there exists a refutation of S, then S is called refutable. 
We give here a sample refutation of a set of formulae. Let 
C1=3x1 q vx* q (P(xi)Alq(x,,.%)), 
Cz=~Y,~~Yz(~~(Y~~Y~)~~Y~~~(Y~~Y~))~ 
C3=Vz1 03z2(r(z1,z2)VVzj q lp(z3)). 
The set S = { Ci, Cz, C,} is contradictory. 
The set Sk(S)= {Sk(C,), Sk(C,), Sk(C,)} is constructed as follows: 
Sk(Ci)= 0 q (p(c’)A lq(c’,x:)), 
WCJ= q (~~(d”,y:)V Oq(y:, Y:)), 
WCs)= o(r(z?,.P(z(:))V q ~P(z:)), 
and the following is a refutation of Sk(S): 
•n(P(c”)A~qk-o,4)) o(m,f’(G))V ASP) 
(4% 1 
Or(z?,f’(zY)) •(~r(d”>y:)V Oq(y:>y:)) 
{dlz,,f(dYy,l 
0 Oh&f’ (do)) 00 (P(c”)A~q(co,x:)) 
jchJ(dh’x~~ 
I 
The substitution applied to obtain each resolvent in the derivation is shown next to 
the corresponding derivation line (the levels of the symbols have been omitted). 
6. Soundness and completeness 
The soundness and completeness proofs are obtained by means of two fundamental 
theorems. The first is a version of Herbrand’s property, limited to those quantifiers 
which are in the scope of no modal operator. In other words, this theorem reduces the 
contradictority of a set of first-order modal formulae to the contradictority of a set of 
formulae, which contain no quantifier outside the scope of modal operators. We also 
state a different version of the theorem, which holds for the systems T and S4. The 
formulation of a general Herbrand’s property for the modal system D can be found in 
[S] or [ll]. An approach to the same problem for the systems T and S4 can be found 
in [lo]. 
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The second theorem is a first-order extension of the result obtained in [lS], which 
reduces the contradictority of a set of formulae whose main logical symbol is a modal 
operator, to the contradictority of a set of formulae which contain less modal 
operators. The propositional versions of this theorem for the systems Tand S4, whose 
formulation can be found in [lo], is implicitly contained in [12]. 
By the repeated application of either result to a set S of modal formulae, quantifiers 
and modal operators can be eliminated, thus reducing the contradictority of S to the 
contradictority of a set of propositional (classical) formulae. 
6.1. In order to state the Herbrand theorem analog, we give some definitions which 
allow the construction of a kind of functional form of formulae. They are essentially 
the same as the corresponding ones in classical logic, except that in the case of modal 
logic they are restricted to quantifiers whose modal degree is 0 (quantifiers which are 
in the scope of no modal operator). In other words, the functional form of modal 
formulae is the result of the application of the classical method for the elimination of 
quantifiers to quantifiers of modal degree 0 only. 
6.1.1. If S is a set of modal formulae and AES, then E(A) is the formula obtained 
from A by deleting every existential quantifier 3x whose modal degree is 0 and 
replacing every occurrence of x by its functional term, which has the following form: 
fX(YI, . ..>Y.)> 
where fX is a Skolem function for x, and y, , . . . , y, are all the universal variables such 
that 3x is in the scope of Vyi. 
We define E(S)= {E(A): AES}. 
6.1.2. Let S be a set of formulae. The sequence of the H-domains of level 0 for 
S, Hi(S) is defined as follows, where a is an arbitrary constant which does not occur 
in S: 
Ho(S)={ > { a u c. c is a constant which occurs in S), 
Hi+l(S)=Hi(S)u{f(tl,..., t,):f is a functional symbol which occurs in 
S and tl, . . ..tnEHi(S)}. 
6.1.3. Let S be a set of formulae and AEE(S). Then A does not contain any 
existential quantifier whose modal degree is 0. The jth expansion in level 0 ofA, Fj(A), 
is defined by induction on the number of propositional connectives and quantifiers 
which are in the scope of no modal operator: 
(a) 
(b) 
(4 
(d) 
Fj( P) = P, if P is a literal; 
Fj(OA)= 024; 
Fj(OA)= OA. 
Fj(A A B) = Fj(A) A Fj(B). 
Fj(A V B)= Fj(A) V Fj(B). 
Fj(VXA(X))= A Fj(A(t)). 
fsHiw(S)) 
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We note that clause (d) is applied only if the modal degree of Vx is 0. If 
E(S)={A,, . ..) A}, then Fj(E(S) )= {Fj(Al), ..., Fj(A,)>. 
6.2. We are now ready to state the Herbrand theorem analog and the propositional 
fundamental theorem used to prove soundness and completeness of modal first-order 
resolution for system D. 
Theorem 1 (Modal Herbrand’s Property for level 0). A set S of closed modal formulae 
is contradictory ifs for some j, Fj(E (S)) is contradictory. 
Theorem 2. Let S be a set of closed modal formulae of the form 
CO* I, . . . . 04, ODI, . . . . O&PI, . . . . Pk}, 
where P 1 ,. . . , P, are literals. S is contradictory ifs one of the following sets is 
contradictory: 
So={P1, . .. . Pk}, 
Sj={A,, ...) An,Bj), 1QjGm. 
For the soundness and completeness proofs, we need also the following theorem. 
Theorem 3. Let S be a set of closed modal formulae of the form 
S is contradictory iff the following two sets are both contradictory: 
&=(CI,*I,...,*,), &={G,*I,...,*,}. 
It should be noted that if Theorem 1 is applied to sets of formulae without any 
modal operator, then it is equivalent to the semantical version of Herbrand’s theorem 
for classical logic. 
Theorem 1 can be proved semantically along the lines of [S] or [ll]. For those 
modal systems which allow a formalization in terms of sequent calculus, where the cut 
elimination theorem holds [28], a syntactical proof can be obtained by induction on 
cut-free proofs. For example, the following version of Theorem 1 holds both for the 
modal system T and for the system S# (a proof can be found in [lo]). 
Theorem l*. A set S={C1,..., C,} of closed formulae is contradictory tff for some j, 
Fj(E(S*)) is contradictory, where S* = {C:, . , C,*} is the closure of S with respect to 
the axiom (T), defined for each formula Ci in S by the following recursive clauses: 
L*=L if L is a literal, 
(A#B)*=A*#B* if # is A or v 
(QxA)* = Qx A* if Q is a quantifier, 
(OA)*= OA*, 
(UA)*=OA*AA*. 
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6.3. Given a set S of closed modal formulae, an AND/OR tree of nodes labeled by 
sets of formulae, Tree(S), can be constructed in the following way, where a set of the 
form {C, AC2,A1, . . . . A,} is considered the same as {C,, C2,.4,, . . . . A,}. It will be 
noticed that Tree(S) is very close to the tree constructed using the standard tableaux 
methods: 
(1) The root of Tree(S) is labeled by S. 
(2) The immediate descendents of a node i of the tree, labeled by the set Si, are OR 
nodes constructed in accordance with the following rules: 
(a) If Si contains some quantifier whose modal degree is 0, then i has (possibly 
an infinite number of) immediate descendents, labeled by the sets 
Otherwise: 
(bl) If Si={C, VC2,Al, ...) A,}, then one of the immediate descendents of i is 
a node without label, which has exactly two AND nodes as immediate 
descendents, labeled by 
{C1,A1, . . ..A.} and {C2,A1,...,&}. 
(b2) If Si has the form 
{DA I,..., q *,, OBi, . . . . O&,, P,,...,Pk}, 
then the following sets are labels of the immediate descendents of i: 
{P 1, . . ..Pk}. 
{A, ,...) A,,Bj} forj=l,..., m. 
To state the next result, we need the following definitions. 
6.3.1. Let S be a set of first-order modal formulae. A node i of Tree(S), labeled by Si, 
is called closed iff one of the following conditions holds: 
(i) i is a terminal node and for some atom P,PES~ and ~PES~; 
(ii) i is an AND node and every immediate descendent of i is closed; 
(iii) i is an OR node and at least one of the immediate descendents of i is closed. 
6.3.2. If S is a set of modal formulae, then Tree(S) is called closed iff its root is 
closed. 
Theorems l-3 allow to prove the following fundamental result. 
Theorem 4. A set S of first-order modal formulae is contradictory if Tree(S) is closed. 
Finally, this theorem is used to prove the completeness and soundness of the 
resolution method. 
Theorem 5 (Completeness and soundness theorem). A set S of first-order modalformulae 
is contradictory ifs Sk(S) is refutable. 
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Theorem 5 can be proved along the following lines. By Theorem 4, it is sufficient to 
show that Tree(S) is closed iff Sk(S) is refutable. The proof of this latter assertion is by 
induction on the depth of Tree(S), and it amounts to showing that for any set S of 
closed modal formulae, 
(i) if S is the label of a terminal node of Tree (S’) for some set S’ of modal formulae, 
then Sk(S) is refutable iff S contains both P and 1 P for some atom P; 
(ii) Sk(S) is refutable iff for somej, Sk(Fj(E(S))) is refutable. 
(iii) IfS={OA, ,..., q A,, OBi ,..., OB,, P1 ,..., Pk}, where Pi ,..., P,areliterals, 
then Sk(S) is refutable iff one of the sets Sk(Sj), for 1 dj<m, is refutable, where 
so={p1,...,pk}, Sj={A,, . . ..A.,Bj}. 
(iv) IfS={CIVCz,A,,..., A,}, then Sk(S) is refutable iff the sets Sk(Si) and Sk(S,) 
are both refutable, where 
SI={C,,AI, . . ..A.}, &=(G,Al, . . ..A.). 
A detailed proof of these assertions can be found in [9]. 
7. Related work 
Konolige [23] and Geissler and Konolige [19] propose a resolution method for 
modal logics of knowledge and belief whose propositional basis is the reduction 
theorems similar to our Theorem 2 in Section 6.2 and the corresponding theorems for 
other modal theories ([lo, 121). However, their recursive application is made by 
explicitly calling the theorem prover itself to determine whether two formulae can be 
resolved against each other. This mechanism may give rise to serious complexity 
problems in a possible implementation of the system. 
As far as the quantificational aspects of Konolige’s system is concerned, it should be 
pointed out that the main problem arises here from the fact that Konolige considers 
modal logics whose semantics allow different individuals to be the interpretation of 
the same term in different possible worlds. So, a term occurring in a modal context 
may denote either its interpretation in the actual world (rigid designation), or what 
one believes its designation to be (nonrigid designation). 
The method of recursively calling the theorem prover, after dropping some external 
modal operator, leaves only the problem of determining unifiability of terms which 
have eventually been brought outside any modal context. In fact, modal formulae are 
considered as unanalyzed predications and “internal” quantifiers are not taken into 
account until the recursive calls to the theorem prover have brought them to the 
surface. The difference between rigid and nonrigid designation is treated by means of 
a “bullet constructor”, which turns nonrigid terms into rigid ones when they are in 
a modal context, i.e. a term in the scope of the rigid designation operator always 
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denotes its interpretation in the actual world. The bullet constructor guarantees the 
correct elimination of quantifiers and the soundness of the unification procedure. 
Abadi and Manna [2] define nonclausal resolution proof systems for several modal 
logics. Some of the rules of the systems are rewrite rules which can introduce new 
logical operators, and whose aim is the transformation of formulae so as to bring 
possible inconsistencies, i.e. complementary subformulae, into the same “possible 
world”, i.e. modal context. Only then can resolution be applied. Should the system be 
fully automatized, such chains of steps would risk to increase the length of the 
procedure redundantly, unless suitable heuristics are implemented. 
Abadi and Manna’s resolution method manipulates formulae with quantifiers. 
Although their approach is very stimulating, it suffers somehow from the same 
limitations as the propositional basis: transformations of formulae may be necessary 
before the resolution rule can be applied to two quantified formulae, and such steps 
may eventually turn out to be useless. In fact, it does not seem easy to recognize from 
outside (i.e. before exploring all the needed transformations of formulae) whether two 
expressions will eventually show to be unifiable or not, in order to decide whether an 
attempt to apply the resolution rule might be worthwhile. 
The authors propose also a modal version of skolemization, although their resolu- 
tion method does not rely upon it. It is in fact presented only as a sometimes-useful 
short-cut. Soundness of skolemization is guaranteed by the use of nonrigid symbols 
(thus, the modal language is extended with the distinction between rigid and nonrigid 
symbols), and its completeness is due to the possible introduction of equations in 
skolemized formulae. This seems to be a very high price to pay. 
Jackson and Reichgelt [21] present a proof method for first-order modal logics 
based on sequent calculus. Modality is represented by an indexing of formulae which 
reflects the path leading from the actual world to the world where they are true. 
Dependencies on worlds are thus made perfectly explicit. The quantifier elimination 
rules introduce Skolem functions whose arguments may be individual variables as 
well as world variables. The differences among modal systems are entirely embedded 
in the nature of the unification algorithm, whose definition is conditioned by the 
features of the accessibility relation for a given logic. We believe that the explicit 
reference to Kripke semantics, although intuitive, makes it hard to think of a full 
automation of the system. 
8. Concluding remarks 
In this work we presented a resolution method for quantified modal logics. The 
propositional method underlying our system is a minor modification of the systems 
proposed by Farifias in [ 12, 13, 151. 
If we wish to compare Fariiias’s approach to the methods briefly discussed in the 
latter section, we remark that it seems to keep modal resolution closer to the classical 
method. Obviously, modal operators introduce a considerable loss of simplicity, but 
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the use of “single-step” resolution rules allows an early elimination of complementary 
literals. Another important remark should be made in favour of this method: it can be 
adapted to formulae which are in a simple normal form, close to the classical clausal 
form, and refined so as to obtain linear deductions [17]. It is this result which allows 
the definition of the modal logic programming language Molog, which has been 
implemented and shown to have a clear declarative semantics [S]. 
The unification procedure needed to extend resolution systems acting only on 
prenex formulae to full first-order logic does not introduce any test except for simple 
numeric tests (greater-than tests on the level of symbols), so that the extension of 
Molog to the case of formulae with quantifiers in the scope of modal operators should 
not be of great difficulty. The possibility to check whether two expressions are 
unifiable before applying the recursive definition of modal resolvent maintains the 
validity of the strategies adopted by Molog to decide whether or not to attempt 
an application of the resolution rule and to avoid useless applications of rules 
which increase the modal complexity of formulae (such as rule m6 for system S4 in 
Section 5.1). 
We believe that our approach to unification in modal contexts should be accessible 
also from different propositional proof procedures for modal logics, such as sequent- 
based or tableaux-like systems. 
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